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Abstract—In this paper, we focus on the localization of a
passive source from time difference of arrival (TDOA) measure-
ments. TDOA values are computed with respect to pairs of fixed
sensors that are required to be accurately time-synchronized.
This constitutes a weakness as all synchronization techniques
are vulnerable to delay injections. Attackers are able either
to spoof the signal or to inject asymmetric delays in the
communication channel. By nature, TDOA measurements are
highly sensitive to time-synchronization offsets between sensors.
Our first contribution is to show that timing attacks can severely
affect the localization process. With a delay of a few microseconds
injected on one sensor, the resulting estimate might be several
kilometers away from the true location of the unknown source.
We also show that residual analysis does not enable the detection
and identification of timing attacks. Our second contribution
is to propose a two-step TDOA-localization technique that is
robust against timing attacks. It uses a known source to define a
weight for each pair of sensors, reflecting the confidence in their
time synchronization. Our solution then uses the weighted least-
squares estimator with the newly created weights and the TDOA
measurements received from the unknown source. As a result,
our method either identifies the network as being too corrupt to
localize, or gives a corrected estimate of the unknown position
along with a confidence metric. Numerical results illustrate the
performance of our technique.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of localizing uncooperative sources that emit
radio frequency signals has been extensively studied in the
field of electronic warfare [1], as well as for civil applica-
tions [2]. Solutions were proposed in various settings such as
sensor networks, radar, sonar or wireless communication [3]–
[5]. Localization methods rely on the timely analysis of mea-
surements such as angles of arrival (AOA), time differences
of arrival (TDOA) between sensors, frequency differences of
arrival (FDOA) between sensors or a combination of them [1],
[6], [7]. Therefore, an accurate synchronization of the time
reference between sensors is essential. This can be achieved
via satellite positioning systems or through packet-based pro-
tocols such as WhiteRabbit [8]. However, both techniques are
vulnerable to timing attacks, which constitutes a weakness
for localization systems. Attackers are able either to spoof
the signal [9] or to insert a delay box on the links used
for the synchronization communication [10]. Such a delay
box modifies asymmetrically the length of the communication
paths, which indirectly injects delays in the time reference of
sensors. The transmitted synchronization data is untouched by
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the attacker, hence it still satisfies all cryptographic security
requirements in place such as authentication, integrity or
confidentiality. A timing attack produces positive or negative
offsets between the time reference of the sensors. The content
of the data received and transmitted by the sensors also
remains protected by the traditional cybersecurity protocols.
The only noticeable effect of such an attack is if it affects
the function of the system. Specifically, if it does not result
in a misestimation of the location, then it is not detectable.
Furthermore, an undetectable attack is required to be accepted
and implemented by the clock controller of the sensors, a too
large delay is flagged and raises suspicion. This is achieved by
injecting small and gradually increasing delays. Although they
require tampering with the communication network, timing
attacks do not require any physical access to the potentially
guarded sensors. Observe that it is realistic to assume non-
guarded links between protected sensors.
In this paper, we focus on the TDOA-based localization
of a passive source from a network of fixed sensors whose
time references could be maliciously manipulated. TDOA
measurements offer high precision hence are widely used.
However, they are easily attacked because they are particularly
sensitive to timing errors. Due to the high propagation speed
of the signal, a small synchronization error can lead to a
large range difference error between the two sensors and the
source. For example, if 3µs are added to a TDOA measure-
ment, then the corresponding range difference is increased
by approximately 900m. Consequently, an attacked network
could become unable to localize sources or an attacked vehicle
could unintendedly enter on a wrong territory. Note that timing
attacks are also a threat to other types of networks. For
example, the control and operation of Smart Grids require an
understanding of the system state at specific time intervals. It
was shown that undetectable timing attacks on grid sensors
are feasible and that they can lead to an incorrect state
estimation, which in turn can result in a blackout or in asset
degradation [11].
Our first contribution is to study the effect of timing attacks
on the TDOA-based localization of an unknown source. We
show that the delays between sensors can lead to a misestima-
tion of the source location. We inject a few microseconds into
one sensor and obtain an estimate that is approximately 1 km
away from the true position of the source. We further explain
how an attacker can compute positive or negative delays such
that the localization process results in a specifically chosen
misestimation. We also show that residual analysis does not
enable the detection and identification of timing attacks.
Our second contribution is to propose a TDOA-localization
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2technique that is robust against timing attacks. It works in two
phases, the first analyses the error in TDOA measurements re-
ceived from a known calibration source. As a result, it defines
a weight for each pair of sensors; this reflects the confidence
we have in their time synchronization. The second phase of our
solution then uses the weighted least-squares (WLS) estimator
with the newly created weights and the TDOA measurements
received from the unknown source. Subsequently, our method
either identifies the network as being too corrupt to localize,
or gives a corrected estimate of the unknown position along
with a confidence metric.
Our calibration technique requires the use of a trusted source
of known coordinates. To our understanding, it is realistic to
assume the existence of such a known source: a sensor of
the localization network or a vehicle equipped with an emitter
can be used for the calibration phase. In this first phase, we
compare true TDOAs with observed TDOAs measured from
signals emitted by the known source. We do not require the
known source to be part of the synchronized network because
our technique does not require the use of timestamps from
the known source. In fact, our solution is immune to a timing
attack on the known source. However, nothing prevents an
attacker from storing emitted calibration signals in order to
replay them in the direction of the attacked sensors at times
and locations of his choice. For example, he could replay
them in a manner that compensates for the introduced attack
delays. To counter such an attack, we propose an encrypted
authenticated challenge-response scheme where the calibration
source is triggered to emit a one-time response signal.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section II,
we discuss related works. We describe our system model in
Section III, together with technical background on TDOA-
localization in an unattacked environment. We define the
attacker’s capabilities and study the effect of timing attacks
in Section IV. We present our calibration-based robust local-
ization technique in Section V. We show how to counter replay
attacks against our solution in Section VI. We present the
numerical results of the evaluation of the performance of our
solution and of the confidence metric in Section VII. Finally,
we conclude the paper in Section VIII.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, the subtleties of TDOA-based localization of
passive sources sparked the interest of researchers. Due to the
accuracy of this localization technique, its use is widespread.
Its sensitivity to sensor location errors, oscillator-frequency-
synchronization errors and time-synchronization errors be-
tween sensors has been the topic of various papers. The
authors of [12], [13] studied the effect of phase and frequency-
synchronization errors on the TDOA estimation, for different
types of oscillators in the cases of single and multi-source
localization. They propose a technique [14] to estimate both
the TDOA measurement and the frequency error between
sensors at low computational and memory complexities when
the oscillator frequency error between two sensors is assumed
to be non-zero and constant. Similarly, the authors of [15],
[16] propose different techniques for estimating the TDOA
between sensors, including oscillator phase and frequency
errors. Their techniques are based on the Maximum Likelihood
estimation of the TDOA, and one of them also estimates
the frequency error of the oscillators. Then, similarly to this
paper, the authors of [17], [18] focused on the localization
of passive sources in systems of moving sensors that suffer
from sensor position errors and from clock-synchronization
bias between sensors. Their model, however, assumes that
sensors are divided into groups within which sensors are time-
synchronized, and that timing offsets are present only among
different groups. In this paper, we assume that sensors are fixed
at known locations and that they are all spaced out, therefore
we assume that there can be time offsets between all sensor
pairs. Furthermore, unlike in the previously mentioned papers,
we assume that the synchronization offsets are not due only
to the use of inaccurate hardware but also to the presence
of malicious activity. As explained in Section IV, we consider
that an attacker is able to introduce time offsets in the clock of
sensors in such a way that the resulting TDOA measurements
seem plausible and intersect well, at a distant target location.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
Consider a network of N time-synchronized sensors Si, 1 ≤
i ≤ N with known coordinates (xi, yi, zi). Suppose that a
moving source S of unknown coordinates (x, y, z) produces
a continuous signal s(t). It is received by several network
sensors in the following form: ri(t) = s(t−∆i) + ei, where
∆i is the time needed for the signal to travel from the source
to sensor Si and ei is Gaussian noise. The receiving sensors
then simply timestamp the received signals and transmit them
to a centralised control center. In order to compute an estimate
∆̂ij of the true but unobservable TDOA ∆ij between each
pair of receiving sensors (Si, Sj), the control center then uses
correlation techniques [19]–[21] on the signal samples
∆̂ij = ∆ij + eij = ∆i −∆j + eij , (1)
where eij is the noise associated with the estimated delay, in
other words, the difference between the true and the estimated
delay. Note that eij is not equal to ei − ej . Each TDOA
∆ij defines a hyperbola on which the source should lie. The
variance of the estimated delay defines a zone of probable
location of the source along the corresponding hyperbola.
By aggregating several measurements, the source is then
estimated to be in a probable zone defined by the intersecting
hyperbolae. The estimation of the source location is not
trivial as it is a quadratic non-convex problem. The relation
between an estimated delay ∆̂ij and the source coordinates
is given by the following equation
∆̂ij =
d(Si, S)− d(Sj , S)
c
+ eij , (2)
where c is the propagation speed of the signal and
d(Si, S) =
√
(xi − x)2 + (yi − y)2 + (zi − z)2 is the dis-
tance between sensor Si and the unknown source S. The
unknowns in this equation are the source coordinates (x, y, z)
and the noise eij . This noise is distributed according to a
3centered normal distribution N (µij , σij) with µij = 0 and
where σij is unknown.
Supposing that the noise of the received signal at various
sensors is i.i.d with same SNR, the covariance matrix is [22],
[23]
K = σ2

1 1/2 · · · 1/2
1/2
. . . . . .
...
...
. . . . . . 1/2
1/2 · · · 1/2 1
 , (3)
where σ2 is the TDOA noise variance. For simulations in
the litterature, the standard deviation is often set arbitrarily
to a plausible value such as 1.83µs or 0.183ns. Nevertheless,
more precise formulas to compute the standard deviation as a
function of the SNRs of sensors are given in [1], [24]
• An aggregated SNR (not in dB) is computed from the
SNRs of the two sensors γij = SNR(γi, γj)
1
γij
=
1
2
(
1
γi
+
1
γj
+
1
γiγj
)
. (4)
• For a low SNR value γij , the standard deviation is given
by
σij =
√
1
8pi2
1
γij
1√
TintW
1
f0
1√
1 + W
2
12f0
, (5)
where Tint is the integration time of the signal for one
measurement, W = f2 − f1 is the frequency bandwidth
and f0 is the center of frequency.
• For a high SNR value γij , the standard deviation is given
by
σij =
√
3
4pi2Tint
1√
γij
1√
f32 − f31
. (6)
From noisy TDOA measurements, both geometrical and
analytical techniques of localization can be found in the littera-
ture [7], [23]. The non-linear least- squares (LS) estimator is a
widespread localization technique that takes the noisy TDOA
measurements as input and searches for a solution (x, y, z)
minimizing the sum of squared errors
arg min
x,y,z
∑
i>j
(
d(Si, S)− d(Sj , S)
c
− ∆̂ij
)2
.
This estimator can be modified to solve the weighted least-
squares problem (WLS) using the covariance matrix of the
TDOA measurements. Throughout the rest of the paper, the
Levenberg-Marquadt (LM) algorithm is used to solve this non-
convex optimization problem, thus estimating the coordinates
of unknown sources. More discussion on the LM algorithm is
provided in Section VII.
In order to reduce the complexity of storage and of the
estimation process, a widespread technique is to consider
only linearly independent measurements by considering only
the TDOA measurements with respect to a reference sensor.
This reduces the number of equations from
(
N
2
)
to N − 1,
where N is the number of available sensors. However, this
technique induces a loss of redundancy which can be fatal to
the localization system in the case of an attack.
IV. IMPACT OF TIME-SYNCHRONIZATION ATTACKS
In this section, we show how an attack on the time reference
of one or more sensors alters the localization process presented
in Section III. We begin by defining the capabilities of the
attacker.
A. Attack Model
We consider two timing attack models: one of them is
referred to as the weak attack model, and the other is referred
to as the strong attack model. In both cases, we suppose that
an attacker is able to introduce an offset ai ∈ R, which can be
positive or negative, to the time reference of sensor Si. Recall
that such an attack does not require physical access to the
sensors as it can be achieved via signal spoofing or delay-
box insertion, depending on the preferred synchronization
technique. With this capability, the goal of the attacker is to
introduce errors in TDOA measurements, thus provoking a
misestimation of the location of an unknown source. In the
weak attack model, the attacker is not able to choose the
misestimation, his goal is to create errors in the localization.
In contrast, in the strong attack model, we further suppose
that the attacker knows the true source coordinates and the
network topology, namely the sensor coordinates. In this case,
the objective of the attacker is to ensure that the localization
process results in a specific targeted misestimation.
B. Impact on Localization
Introducing delays ai and aj to sensors Si and Sj respec-
tively, adds components to Eq.(1)
∆̂ij = ∆ij + ai − aj + eij = ∆ij + µij + eij , (7)
where µij = ai−aj is the introduced delay difference between
the two sensors. Observe that ∆̂ij − ∆ij is still distributed
according to N (µij , σij), with µij = 0 if no delays are
inserted and µij = ai − aj otherwise. Therefore, introducing
delays does not guarantee an impact on measurements and
thus on the localization. In fact, the attack is meaningful only
if there is a non-negligible delay difference between the time
references of at least two sensors. If an attacker introduces
the same delay to all sensors of the network, they will all be
under attack yet remain synchronized with each other. Hence,
the functionality of the system will not be altered and the
presence of malicious activity will be undetected. When the
attack is such that the difference µij > σij is non-negligible
in comparison to the Gaussian noise, the measurement ∆̂ij
and its corresponding hyperbola are significantly modified.
As a result, the localization process fails to give an accurate
estimate. Next, we give two attack scenarios that illustrate the
actions of an attacker as in the two proposed attack models of
Section IV-A.
In both scenarios, we consider a two-dimensional grid of
side of 20 km with four sensors placed as in Figures 1 and 2.
The unknown source emits a signal that propagates to the
four sensors. We suppose that the sensors send their received
signal samples to a control center that processes them. The
resulting TDOA measurements are given as input to the WLS
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Fig. 1: Weak-attack model scenario: sensor 1 is delayed by 2.47µs.
The red TDOA hyperbolae are shifted by this delay and the
resulting source estimate is incorrect by approximately 1 km.
estimator as described in Section III. In this simulation, we
set the noise standard deviation to σ = 2.192ns for all TDOA
measurements, this value is further discussed in Section VII.
In the the weak attack-model scenario, the attacker delays
the time reference of sensor S1 by 2.47µs, which modifies
the three corresponding hyperbolae, drawn in red in Figure 1.
The resulting WLS estimate of the unknown source location
is incorrect by approximately 1 km, thus illustrating that
localization from TDOA measurements is highly sensitive to
time offsets. As the injected delay increases, the accuracy of
the estimate decreases. Note that in this scenario, the full set of
measurements was considered. Supposing that we considered
only three linearly independent measurements with respect to
sensor S1, then the estimate would be even less accurate as the
WLS estimator would have received only wrong measurements
as input. In other words, only the red hyperbolae from Figure 1
would be taken into account and none of the black ones.
In the strong attack-model scenario, the attacker knows the
coordinates of the sensors and the true coordinates of the
source. With such knowledge, he is able to compute the delays
to be injected such that the estimation process results in a
specific targeted misestimation:
• From the source and sensor coordinates, he computes
the true delays of propagation of the signal between the
source and the sensors ∆i =
d(Si,S)
c , ∀1 ≤ i ≤ N .
• Similarly, he computes the true delays of propagation of
the signal between the targeted misestimation location
and the sensors ∆ti, ∀1 ≤ i ≤ N .
• The attack is simply the difference between the two: the
delay to inject to sensor Si is ai = ∆ti −∆i.
This attack is illustrated in Figure 2, where the delays are com-
puted specifically such that all hyperbolae are modified in a
plausible manner, intersecting near the targeted misestimation
location. The resulting estimate is, as chosen by the attacker,
almost 9 km away from the true source location.
C. Residual Analysis
Once an estimate Sest is computed from measurement
values, it is useful to compute and analyze the residuals in
order either to assess the accuracy of the estimator or to
attempt to detect and identify bad data in the measurements.
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Fig. 2: Strong-attack model scenario: delays are strategically com-
puted which results in a specific misestimation almost 9 km away
from the true source location.
For a pair of sensors (Si, Sj), the corresponding residual is
computed as follows
d(Si, Sest)− d(Sj , Sest)
c
− ∆̂ij .
The residuals give insight on how well the estimate fits the
measurements. Hence, if all hyperbolae intersect near the
estimated location, then the residuals will have small values.
However, if the points of intersection of the hyperbolae define
a large probable zone of location, then the resulting estimate
will be far from some or all hyperbolae, thus resulting in large
residuals. Residual values are given in Table I for the no-attack
scenario and for the scenarios depicted in Figures 1 and 2 that
correspond to the two attack models. Observe that the strong
attack-model scenario and the no-attack scenario have similar
residuals of order of magnitude below a nanosecond. This is
as expected because, in both cases, the estimate satisfies well
all measurements. Against the strong attack model the residual
analysis fails to detect the presence of malicious activity. In the
weak attack-model scenario, Table I shows that three residuals
have values by three orders of magnitude larger than their
corresponding values in the no-attack scenario. However, these
large residuals are not all related to sensor S1. In this case,
the residual analysis succeeds in detecting the presence of
malicious activity in the system but fails to identify it clearly.
Overall, residual analysis is misleading for this study as it
either fails to detect the presence of an attack or fails to
identify untrustworthy measurements. Another approach for
building resilience against timing attacks is proposed in the
following section.
V. CALIBRATION-BASED ROBUST LOCALIZATION
As mentioned above, the analysis of residuals during the
localization of an unknown source is not sufficient to counter
timing attacks. In this section, we present a robust localization
strategy that works in two phases. The first is a calibration
phase that makes use of a known source to estimate the pair-
wise synchronized sensors of the network. The second phase
of our strategy consists in the localization of an unknown
source, given the results of the calibration process. We also
show how to compute a confidence metric that gives insight
on the accuracy of the estimated location.
5attack type ∆12 (s) ∆13 (s) ∆14 (s) ∆23 (s) ∆24 (s) ∆34 (s)
weak attack model scenario 8.11e− 11 1.59e− 9 −3.56e− 6 −2.33e− 9 −3.57e− 6 −3.57e− 6
strong attack model scenario −3.25e− 9 −1.34e− 9 −5.38e− 10 −4.32e− 10 2.19e− 9 2.2e− 9
no-attack −1.68e− 9 −4.73e− 10 2.03e− 10 −4.2e− 10 −6.3e− 11 5.68e− 10
TABLE I: TDOA residuals. The values are similar in the no-attack and strong attack-model scenarios: the strong attack is undetected by
residual analysis. Some values are increased by three orders of magnitude in the weak attack-model scenario, a majority vote points to
S4 as being attacked but the only attacked sensor is S1: residual analysis detects malicious activity but does not identify it clearly.
A. Calibration Phase
In this first phase, we use authenticated received signals
emitted by known sources of known coordinates. Our tech-
nique then compares the resulting TDOA measurements with
the true delays that should be observed. These true values
are easily computed from the known coordinates as shown
in the previous section for the computation of specific attack
delays. The aim of the calibration phase is to define weights
wij for each pair of sensors (Si, Sj), reflecting the confidence
level of their time-synchronization. Recall that ∆̂ij − ∆ij is
distributed according to N (µij , σij) with µij = 0 if Si and Sj
are time-synchronized. Therefore, the weight wij must reflect
the confidence with which we could declare that µij = 0
given the true delay ∆ij and multiple samples of ∆̂ij , denoted
∆̂1ij ,...∆̂
n
ij . For example, the weights could have binary values
in order to define hard clusters within which sensors are time-
synchronized:
wij =
{
0 if µij > σij
1 if µij ≤ σij
.
Nevertheless, given noisy observations, the true cluster can
only be estimated with a certain level of confidence. In
practice, hard clustering methods are not able to minimize
both the probabilities of false positives and false negatives.
Therefore, we use a soft clustering method, i.e., we allow non-
binary values wij ∈ [0, 1].
Hypothesis testing and the z-test in particular, are often used
in order to determine whether a sample data-set is from a
population with a specific mean. The z-test can be used only
if the sample data is assumed to follow a normal distribution
of known standard deviation as it is the case for the n samples
of ∆̂ij −∆ij . The test computes the standardized statistic
zij =
(∆̂ij −∆ij)
σij√
n
,
where (∆̂ij −∆ij) corresponds to the sample mean of the
n observed delay differences. If it is truly the case that
µij = 0, then this standardized statistic zij must be dis-
tributed according to N (0, 1). Depending on the value of
zij and a predefined threshold, the test either accepts or
rejects the hypothesis that µij = 0. However, as mentioned
above, the weights that we define are not constrained to have
binary values. We define them as a function of the z-test p-
values.Specifically, the weight wij is a function of the proba-
bility of observing a test statistic larger or equal to zij given
that µij = 0. This probability is computed as erfc(zij/
√
2),
where erfc(x) = 2√
pi
∫∞
x
e−t
2
dt is the well-known comple-
mentary error-function. As the difference between the mea-
sured and the true delay decreases, the corresponding p-value
increases. In order to amplify the weight differences between
pairs of sensors with reasonably large and extremely small
p-values, we define weights to be wij = (pvalueij)1/v ,
where v ∈ R. The exponent v can be optimally chosen to
maximize the weight difference for two specific p-values:
v = 15.0776 maximizes the weight difference for p-values
10−4 and 10−10. Nevertheless, our simulations show that all
choices of v ∈ [10, 30] give satisfactory localization results
with negligible variance. The computed weights are used in
the localization process of any unknown source until they are
updated. This means that any TDOA measurement that results
from the correlation of signals received by sensors Si and Sj
will be weighed by wij . Note that if all p-values are equal
to zero, no sensor pair data will be trusted to be used in the
localization process. If all p-values are very low but larger than
zero, then all sensor data is taken into consideration. But our
confidence in the synchronization of all sensor pairs is low,
hence we expect low accuracy. Whereas if all p-values are
high, the confidence in the synchronization is high throughout
the network, and we expect to obtain accurate estimates.
In order to give insight about the level of accuracy with
which the localization process is able to compute an estimate
of the location of any unknown source, we propose to add the
computation of a confidence metric to the calibration phase.
As in two dimensions, the minimal number of measurements
required to localize a source is two, the accuracy of a location
estimate depends on how well the second most trustworthy
sensor pair seems to be synchronized; this is captured by the
second best p-value. Furthermore, the accuracy improves with
redundancy, hence if the third best p-value is also high, we
expect that the estimate will be even more accurate. Hence,
our proposed confidence metric cfd is defined as the sum of the
second and third best p-values to the power 1/v, divided by
two. Similarly in three dimensions, one level of redundancy is
achieved by including the fourth best p-value and by dividing
the sum by three instead of two. More discussion on this metric
is provided in Section VII. The operations of the calibration
phase are recapitulated in Algorithm 1. It shows how to
compute the weights for each sensor pair and the confidence
metric of the network at a given time.
B. Robust-Localization Phase
The purpose of the second phase of our technique is to spo-
radically localize unknown sources by using data from sensors
that are possibly suffering from a timing attack. In Section III,
the WLS estimator was introduced with weights defined by the
covariance matrix of the noise of the measurements. Our robust
localization technique further weights the squared errors with
the weights computed during the calibration phase. In other
6Algorithm 1 Define-weights(N , Sc, σ, c, ∆̂1, ..., ∆̂n, v,D)
Input: N (network of sensors Si, 1 ≤ i ≤ N ), Sc (known
calibration source), σ (standard deviation of TDOA measure-
ments), c (signal speed), ∆̂1, ..., ∆̂n (n symmetric matrices of
TDOA measurements from Sc), v (weight function exponent), D
(dimension 2D or 3D)
for Si ∈ N do
∆i ← d(Si,Sc)c
end for
weights← ∅
pvals← ∅
for (Si, Sj) ∈ N 2, i 6= j do
(e1ij , ..., e
n
ij)← (∆̂1ij −∆i + ∆j , ..., ∆̂nij −∆i + ∆j)
pvalue← z-test(e1ij , ..., enij , σij)
pvals← pvals ∪ pvalue
weights← weights ∪ (pvalue)1/v
end for
if D = 2 then
cfd ← (max2nd (pvals))
1/v+(max
3rd
(pvals))1/v
2
else
cfd ← (max2nd (pvals))
1/v+(max
3rd
(pvals))1/v+(max
4th
(pvals))1/v
3
end if
weights← weightssum(weights)
Output: weights, cfd
words, our solution is to search for (x, y, z) minimizing∑
i>j
wij
σ2ij
(
d(Si, S)− d(Sj , S)
c
− ∆̂ij
)2
.
Algorithm 2 describes how the robust localization phase works
for a two-dimensional grid, when at least two sensor pairs
have non-zero weights. It uses the function noise std(γi, γj) to
compute the noise standard deviation of TDOA measurement
∆̂ij from the SNR values at sensors Si and Sj according to
equations 4, 5 and 6. In the case where all weights are set
to zero, the algorithm states that the system is too corrupt to
reliably estimate the location of the unknown source.
Algorithm 2 Robust-localization(weights,N , ∆̂, γ,D)
Input: weights (computed by Algorithm 1), N (network of sen-
sors), ∆̂ (matrix of received TDOAs from unknown source), γ
(vector of SNR values for each sensor), D (dimension 2D or 3D)
if |nonzero(weights)| ≥ D then
σ ← ∅
for (Si, Sj) ∈ N 2, i 6= j do
σ ← σ ∪ noise std(γi, γj)
end for
estimate ← WLS(weights
σ2
,M,N )
else
estimate ← ”corrupt system”
end if
Output: estimate
Recall that in the weak attack-model scenario presented in
Section IV, only sensor S1 is attacked with a delay of 2.47µs.
When no defense strategy is in place, the LM algorithm on the
full set of measurements gives a WLS estimate approximately
1 km away from the true source location. Using our robust
localization technique with the LM algorithm, we obtain
an estimate only 40cm away from the true source location.
Furthermore, recall that in the strong attack-model scenario
considered in Section IV, the attack delays were computed
specifically such that the localization of a particular unknown
source would result in a targeted location. The computed
delays shown on Figure 2 are: a1 = 3ms, a2 = 0s,
a3 = 5.8ms and a4 = 3.65ms. The obtained estimate was,
as chosen by the attacker, approximately 9 km away from
the source. Whereas our technique flags all sensor pairs as
not synchronized, and all weights are set to zero. As a result,
our algorithm states that the system is too corrupt to give an
estimate.
VI. COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST REPLAY ATTACKS
The calibration phase of our solution presented in Sec-
tion V-A, relies on signals received by the sensors and emitted
by a calibration source of known coordinates. In this section,
we suppose that an attacker seeks to perform an attack on the
calibration phase of our solution in order to make it attribute
wrong weights. In case of such a successful attack, our robust
localization would discard trustworthy measurements and/or
trust attacked measurements. As a result, our technique would
fail to detect malicious activity and would discard correct
measurements.
In this section, we consider two additional attack models in
which the attacker targets the calibration phase of our robust
solution. His goal is to provoke a wrong weight attribution,
thus maintaining the undetectability of his ongoing timing
attack or neutralising the localization system. In the weak
calibration attack model, we suppose that the attacker is
able to record signals from the calibration source in order
to replay them at times and locations of his choice. For
example, he could replay them in a manner that compensates
for the introduced attack delays. In the strong calibration attack
model, we further suppose that the attacker is able to jam
signals emitted by the calibration source [25]. We assume that
the attacker does not jam continuously but selectively. Note
that a sensor being continuously jammed would be flagged as
suspicious due to other identification methods, such as SNR
analysis. The fact that an attacker with complete control on the
flow of signals in the network would be all powerful, further
justifies the assumption of a selective jamming.
In order to prevent such attacks, we propose an encrypted
authenticated challenge-response scheme between the cali-
bration source (CS) and the control center (CC). For the
duration of this protocol, we assume that CS is stationary
and emits signals continuously and that CC is responsible
for triggering CS into embedding specific responses in the
emitted signal. The first iteration of the scheme is depicted in
Figure 3. We suppose that due to a key infrastructure, CC has
a certificate binding its identity with its public key PKCC . We
further suppose that CS knows the public key of the certificate
authority PKCA and that CC and CS share two secrets p1 and
p2 of large entropy. At the first iteration of the scheme, CC
sends its certificate to CS who first verifies it using PKCA
and then extracts the public key PKCC . The latter will be
used to authenticate CC to CS, at all subsequent iterations of
the scheme.
During the calibration phase, CC continuously sends the
encryption of a one-time random challenge c concatenated
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Fig. 3: First iteration of the encrypted authenticated challenge-
response scheme that counters replay attacks against the calibration
phase of our robust-localization technique; following iterations are
identical but don’t include the cert verification and the extraction
of PKCC .
with a flag f ∈ {0, 1} that indicates whether or not CS should
compute and embed a response r in the emitted signal. The use
of this flag enables us to hide from the attacker the locations
in the signal where there are embedded responses. These
responses are used to compute the TDOA measurements that
are analyzed during the calibration phase. Note that, in order
to be successful, the attacker needs to succeed in delaying
a number of these responses embedded in the signal. Using
the flag, instead of sending useful responses continuously,
decreases the probability that a useful response is delayed
by an adversary. This is due to the fact that in order to be
undetected, the adversary is required to jam only selectively.
Therefore, if we assume that there is a maximal frequency with
which he can jam signals while remaining undetected, if he
does not know which parts of the signal are useful and should
be jammed, then the proportion of TDOA measurements that
he successfully attacks is decreased. Note that, for this to be
true, it is required that the flag be picked at random and that
the signal emitted by CS without an embedded response be
indistinguishable from when it contains a response.
The one-time challenge c concatenated with f , is encrypted
into ciphertext e via a symmetric encryption scheme using
secret key p1. In order to authenticate itself to CS, CC also
sends a signature of e computed using its private key PVCC .
Upon reception of (e, s), CS verifies the validity of the pair
sent by CC. If it is valid, CS decrypts e using p1 and extracts
f . If the flag is equal to 1, then it computes a response
r that corresponds to the result of a chosen pseudo-random
function with c as input and secret p2 as the key. Then, CS
embeds r in the signal. In contrast, if the flag is equal to
0, CS does not embed anything in the signal. This signal
is received by various known nearby sensors who simply
timestamp everything before transmitting to CC. Finally, CC
accepts only signals containing the valid response r that are
transmitted by specific nearby sensors able to correctly decode
signals from CS. It then correlates the accepted signals to
obtain TDOA measurements. Note that to analyze the cor-
relation of the signals, the signals are aligned according to the
timestamp that was associated by the receiving sensors. Hence,
introducing delays in the transmission of received signals
between the sensors and CC does not affect the resulting
TDOA measurements. This constitutes one iteration of the
overall scheme. We denote by m, the number of iterations
with f set to 1. Hence, at the end of the process, there are m
resulting TDOA measurements per sensor pair. Recall that the
calibration phase described in Algorithm 1 requires n observed
measurements for each sensor pair. Below, we discuss the
selection of n among m measurements per sensor pair and
analyze the security of our scheme firstly against a weak
calibration attacker and secondly against a strong calibration
attacker.
First, in order to enforce security against a weak calibration
attacker, we propose to set m = n and to discard signals
containing a reoccurring valid specific response r. We show
in Theorem 1 that this scheme is secure against a weak calibra-
tion attacker with overwhelming probability, i.e., the attacker
is unable to inject delays in the TDOA measurements of the
calibration phase. The resulting TDOA measurements are then
given as input to Algorithm 1 as described in Section V.
Theorem 1. Assuming that challenges are unique, that p1 and
p2 are secret, that signals with a reoccurring r are discarded,
and that all relay attacks take more time than the direct signal
to propagate to the sensors, then the encrypted authenticated
challenge-response scheme with m = n iterations is secure
in the weak calibration attack model with overwhelming
probability.
Proof. Since p1 and p2 are secrets of large entropy and since
c is unique and also a secret of large entropy, there is a
negligible probability that an adversary manages to forge a
valid response r that corresponds to the latest challenge c.
Therefore, we assume that he can emit signals containing
valid responses only by replaying those emitted by CS. As we
assume that all relay attacks take more time than the direct
signal takes to propagate to the sensors, all replayed signals
will be received by CC with timestamps that are more recent
than the timestamps of the direct signals. Hence, as they were
already received by CC, replayed signals are all discarded. We
conclude that the encrypted authenticated challenge-response
scheme with m = n iterations is secure in the weak calibration
attack model, as long as the adversary is unable to forge an
r, hence it is secure with overwhelming probability.
Second, when we consider a strong calibration attacker
able to jam signals, it is possible that the first occurring
response r is a replayed signal. In this scenario, we assume
that the attacker can selectively jam signals emitted by CS
and replay them such that the direct signal is never received
by the sensors. In order to enforce security in this strong
attack model, we propose to set m much larger than n. In
other words, we propose to select a small portion n of the
received measurements m to use as input for Algorithm 1. As
mentioned earlier, we suppose that the attacker does not jam
continuously but selectively so that only qm measurements
are successfully delayed by the adversary, where q is the
proportion of attacked measurements. As the TDOA noise is
distributed according to a Gaussian distribution, the (1− q)m
unattacked measurements are distributed according to a Gaus-
sian distribution centered in the observable TDOA value that
8depends on the coordinates of the sensors, the coordinates
of CS and the possible time-synchronization offset between
the sensors. In contrast, the qm attacked measurements are
expected to be distributed according to another Gaussian
distribution centered around a value that depends on the delay
difference with which the signal is replayed to the different
sensors.
Our strategy is to analyze the distribution of the m observed
measurements in order to extract the center of the tallest
Gaussian distribution and to select the n measurements that are
nearest to it. More specifically, we use a binning algorithm on
all the received measurements; the algorithm returns b bins of
uniform width covering the range of the m measurements. This
reveals the shape of the sample distribution. We then extract
the bin of highest density and iteratively extract its surrounding
bins, until the sub-sampled dataset is of cardinality at least
n. Then, we estimate the probability density function of the
selected data and search for its peak value. As a result, we
obtain an estimate of the center of the tallest underlying
Gaussian distribution, in other words, of the TDOA value that
should be observed. Finally, we select the n measurements
that are nearest to the newly found estimate. Observe that
this technique works in favour of the system only when there
are fewer attacked than unattacked measurements during the
calibration phase. Otherwise, the tallest Gaussian distribution
would correspond to the underlying distribution of the attacked
measurements. These selected measurements can then be given
as input to Algorithm 1 as described in Section V. We show
the following claim through numerical analysis in Appendix.
Claim 1. As long as the proportion q of attacked measure-
ments is lower or equal to 0.45, our strategy is secure against
a strong calibration attacker.
VII. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our solution
presented in Section V by considering various attack scenarios.
We show through Matlab simulations that our solution is
robust to timing attacks and that the confidence metric is
reliable. We start by defining the testing environment in two
dimensions. We then consider a three-dimensional simulation.
A. Two-Dimensional Testing Environment
We consider a two-dimensional grid of side of 20 km on
which we place four sensors, as illustrated in figures 1 and 2.
We assume that at the time instant of the analysis, the unknown
source is located at coordinates [3333.3,−889.1111] and the
known calibration source at [0,−4000] all in meters, with
respect to the center of the grid. In Section VII-D, we show
a three-dimensional simulation on the same grid, to which we
add altitude coordinates. In our simulations, we assume that
the TDOA noise is i.i.d with a standard deviation of 2.192ns
for all measurements. We computed this standard deviation
from Eqs. 4, 5, 6 with the following parameters:
• the integration window of the signal Tint = 60 ms,
• the bandwidth of the signal W = 1 MHz,
• the center of frequency f0 = 30′000 Hz,
• the SNR γi = 3 dB ∀Si.
For the calibration phase, we created simulated TDOA mea-
surements ∆̂ij from the known calibration source for all sensor
pairs (Si, Sj) with the following procedure:
• we use the coordinates to compute the true time ∆i taken
by the signal to propagate from the calibration source to
sensor Si for both sensors,
• we compute the true TDOA ∆ij = ∆i −∆j ,
• depending on the attack scenario, we add delays
∆′ij = ∆ij + ai − aj ,
• we add Gaussian noise ∆̂ij = ∆′ij + eij
with eij ∈ N (0, 2.192e− 9),
• we repeat this n = 15 times in order to have 15
measurements for each pair of sensors.
Our calibration procedure defined by Algorithm 1 then uses
the simulated measurements in the following way:
1) We compute the observed error êij = ∆̂ij − ∆ij for
each measurement, using the known coordinates of the
calibration source.
2) For each pair of sensors, we compute the p-value result-
ing from the z-test with the 15 observed errors êij .
3) We compute the weights w by exponentiating all p-
values to 1/v with v = 15.0776 and normalizing them.
4) We compute the confidence metric as the sum of the
second and third largest weights before normalization,
divided by two.
Recall that the exponent value was chosen to maximise the
weight difference between p-values 10−4 and 10−10 and that
we experimentally observed that all choices of v ∈ [10, 30]
give satisfactory results with low variance between them.
For each pair of sensors such that the corresponding weight
is non-zero, we create a simulated TDOA measurement ∆̂ij
from the unknown source to localize:
• we use the coordinates to compute the true time ∆i taken
by the signal to propagate from the unknown source to
sensor Si for both sensors,
• we compute the true TDOA ∆ij = ∆i −∆j ,
• depending on the attack scenario, we add delays
∆′ij = ∆ij + ai − aj ,
• we add Gaussian noise ∆̂ij = ∆′ij + eij
with eij ∈ N (0, 2.192e− 9).
We implement the robust localization with the simulated
measurements as in Algorithm 2:
1) We compute a geometrical estimate of the source loca-
tion (xg, yg) as explained below.
2) We use the Matlab LM algorithm as a WLS estimator
on all ∆̂ij with weights wij computed at step (3).
The initial step size is by default 0.01 and the initial
solution is (xg, yg). We obtain the estimated robust
source coordinates (x, y).
In all simulations, we analyze the confidence metric and the
distance between our estimate and the true source coordinates.
Recall that the WLS estimator we use is the LM algorithm.
It is a gradient descent algorithm that requires an initial
solution and step size that are updated iteratively. When the
gradient is small, the step size is chosen small so that we can
9move gradually closer to the minima without missing it; in this
case the algorithm is similar to the Gauss-Newton method. In
contrast, when the gradient is large, the step size is chosen
large and the algorithm behaves similarly to the steepest
descent method. The initial solution we use is a geometrical
estimate computed as the coordinate-wise weighted median
of intersection points of all hyperbolae. The weight of both
coordinates of an intersection point corresponds to the smallest
weight among the weights of the corresponding TDOAs.
B. Performance in Attack Scenarios
In order to test the performance of our technique, we
apply it in five different scenarios of attack with increasing
attack delays. Each attack scenario corresponds to an attack
location, specifically to a subset of the sensors. In all of the
scenarios, we perform attacks with 25 different delays ranging
from 0 to 50 seconds. We simulated ten thousand times each
attack scenario with each delay size. The 1′250′000 results
we obtained are presented in Figure 4, where each color
corresponds to a specific attack scenario. More specifically,
Figure 4a shows the confidence metric as a function of the
distance between the true source position and our estimate in
meters for each simulation. We refer to this distance as the
estimate error. Figures 4b and 4c show the sample mean and
confidence interval of the estimate error as a function of the
delay size in seconds.
The first scenario is a control scenario in which no attack
takes place, it is presented in beige on the figures. We observe
that the estimate error is on average below 0.5m and that the
confidence metric is always high, above 0.8.
Then, we consider a scenario where only sensor S1 is
under attack, it is presented in pastel green on the figures. We
observe that whatever the delay injected, the estimate is always
quite accurate with an error on average slightly above the one
from the no-attack scenario. The estimate error is still in the
proximity of 0.5m and remains below 4m. Figure 4a shows
that the confidence metric is also quite high as it remains
above 0.7. The slight reduction of estimate error comes from
the fact that discarding signals from S1 reduces the redundancy
but still provides enough signals to locate accurately with one
level of redundancy.
The third scenario, presented in purple, consists of attacking
two sensors, S1 and S2, with the same delay. We observe that
when the injected delay is below the standard deviation of the
noise, the estimate error is as in the no-attack scenario. Then,
as the delay increases, the distance between the estimate and
the true source position also increases until it stabilises. This
is explained by the fact that as the delay increases, the im-
pacted TDOAs are less trusted but are still taken into account
with a small weight, until they are completely discarded. At
some point, only two TDOA values are trusted and used for
localization. This is exactly enough, as the simulation is in 2D,
but removes all redundancy. Therefore, the estimate grows less
accurate. Nevertheless, the estimate error stays well below 4m
on average. This decrease in accuracy is accompanied by a
decrease of the confidence metric value that is concentrated
around 0.5 and remains between 0.35 and 0.7. This illustrates
that the source can be localized fairly correctly but with less
accuracy as there is no redundancy.
The fourth scenario, presented in light blue, is performed by
attacking S1 and S2 with the same delay of 500s, such that
only two TDOAs are used from the start of the simulation.
Then, we increase slightly the delay difference between the
sensors of synchronized pairs. Specifically, we attack in the
following way:
• delay for S1: 500s,
• delay for S2: (500 + d)s,
• delay for S3: 0s,
• delay for S4: (0 + d)s,
where d is the delay difference that takes values from the
same 25 different delays considered above. We observe on
Figure 4c that the distance between the true source position
and our estimate starts as in the previous scenario, which is as
expected because only two TDOAs are trusted. Then, as the
delay differences increase, the two TDOAs are increasingly
affected, thus the localization relies solely on wrong TDOAs
and the resulting estimate grows less accurate. We observe
that when the delay differences are around 30ns, the two
TDOAs are declared as untrustworthy and the overall system
as too corrupted to localize. In the worst case scenario, the
estimate error is approximately 50m but the corresponding
confidence metric is around 2 × 10−21, which is extremely
low. For this simulation, Figure 4 shows that the estimates are
less accurate and that the confidence metric is low, below 0.35.
Nevertheless, we can identify a grey zone, where the estimate
error is below 4m and the confidence metric is also low. In
this case, a user of our solution might want to discard the
estimate when in fact it is not very far from the true position
of the source. Although this is unfortunate, it constitutes a
false negative that is not as fatal as trusting a very inaccurate
estimate.
We identified more cases of false negatives in the fifth
scenario. In this setting, we start by attacking sensor S4 with a
delay of 500s. In this way, the TDOAs with respect to S4 are
discarded from the start. Then, similarly to the fourth scenario,
we increase slightly the delay differences between the three
synchronized sensors:
• delay for S1: 0s,
• delay for S2: (0 + d)s,
• delay for S3: (0 + 2d)s,
• delay for S4: 500s.
The results of this scenario are depicted in coral red in
Figure 4. The accuracy of the estimate decreases in a fashion
similar to the previous scenario but with lower error values.
This is due to the fact that three TDOA values are used instead
of two. Even though they are under attack, they include one
level of redundancy. The largest distance between the source
and the estimate remains below 10m. After that, the system
is declared as too corrupt. Although the accuracy is better in
this scenario than in the previous one, the confidence metric
ranges also between 0 and 0.35. Similarly, there are cases of
accurate estimation but low confidence, which constitutes false
negatives.
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Fig. 4: Results from five different timing attack scenarios each with 25 different delays, each simulated 10′000 times: (a) confidence
metric as a function of the distance between the true source position and the estimate provided by our robust solution, we observe that the
metric is related to the accuracy and shows if there is redundancy in the measurements. There are some false-negative cases but no false
positives. (b) the mean and confidence interval of the estimate error for each attack delay for three different scenarios. (c) the mean and
confidence interval of the estimate error for each attack delay for two other scenarios: when the system is too corrupt, it stops localizing.
In summary, our method gives an estimate which is always
quite accurate, considering the fact that blindly trusting all
TDOAs would lead to errors of many kilometers. When
the system is too corrupt, it declares that the confidence
level is too low to localize. We showed that the confidence
metric gives useful insight on the accuracy of the estimate,
although it can lead to some false-negative cases. We have not
found any corner cases of false positives, in other words, our
solution never trusts a highly inaccurate solution. If we were
to recommend a course of action depending on the confidence
metric, it would be the following:
• confidence metric ∈ [0.75, 1]: trust the estimate to be as
accurate as it can be because it includes at least one level
of redundancy,
• confidence metric ∈ [0.3, 0.75]: probably computed with
no redundancy, trust the estimate to be fairly correct but
slightly less accurate,
• confidence metric ∈ [0, 0.3]: the true source is in a
probable zone around the estimate, this result is not very
accurate and trusting it depends on the application,
• algorithm 2 output is ”corrupt system”: the attacks are
too important to define even a probable zone of location.
C. Trajectory Simulations
Next, we simulate the localization of an unknown source at
nine different time instants and compare the true trajectory, the
trajectory estimated with our robust solution, and the trajectory
naively estimated by trusting all measurements. The naive
estimates are found by the WLS estimator with all weights
set to 1. This section shows that our solution substantially
improves the accuracy of the estimates when compared with
the accuracy of the naive estimates obtained by ignoring the
presence of timing attacks. We do so in three different attack
scenarios, one for each confidence metric interval identified
above.
In the first scenario we consider, only sensor S4 is attacked
with a fixed delay of 30µs. The results are given in Figure 5.
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Fig. 5: Estimation results at nine different time instants when S4
is attacked by 30µs, the confidence metric is above 0.86: the first
three naive estimates are out-of-bounds and then wrong by 2 km,
whereas our solution provides estimates indistinguishable from the
source; at the sixth time instant, our robust estimate is less than
60cm away from the source.
Shown as out-of-bounds, the naive estimates are more than
100′000 km away from the true source position at the first
three time instants. Such obviously incorrect estimates would
be flagged as bad data as it is not plausible to consider an
estimate that far. Then, for the six remaining time instants,
the naive estimates are off by more than two kilometers. In
contrast, when we zoom closer to the source at the sixth
time instant, we can observe that the distance between the
true source and our robust estimate is always under 60 cm.
Note that the confidence metric is always above 0.86 in this
scenario.
In the second scenario, sensors S1 and S3 are both attacked
with a fixed delay of 30µs. The results given in Figure 6, show
that the estimate obtained naively is out-of-bounds at the first
time instant. In fact, it is incorrect by more than 20 km at
first and by approximately 5 km afterwards. In contrast, our
solution provides estimates that are much more accurate, as
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Fig. 6: Estimation results at nine different time instants when S1
and S3 are attacked by 30µs, the confidence metric is above 0.38:
the naive estimate is out-of-bounds at first and then wrong by more
than 5 km, whereas our solution provides estimates indistinguish-
able from the source; at the sixth time instant, our robust estimate
is less than 50cm away from the source.
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Fig. 7: Estimation results at nine different time instants when S1,
S2 and S4 are respectively attacked with a delay of 5s, (5+3e−9)s
and 3e − 9s; the confidence metric is below 0.25: the naive esti-
mates are out-of-bounds at all time instants, whereas, our solution
provides estimates indistinguishable from the source; at the sixth
time instant, our robust estimate is less than 1m away from the
source.
they are all under 2m away from the true position. In this
scenario, the confidence metric is always above 0.38.
In the last trajectory scenario, we attack sensors S1 and S2
with a delay of 5 seconds and we add a delay of 3ns to S2 and
S4. Namely, sensor pairs (S1, S2) and (S3, S4) are believed
to be time synchronized when in fact, they have a delay
difference slightly above the usual noise standard deviation
2.192ns. In this scenario, the confidence metric is always well
below 0.25. Figure 7 shows that the naive estimates are always
out-of-bounds as they are wrong by more than 1′000′000 km.
Figure 7 also shows that our estimate is always very close
to the source. More precisely, our solution provides estimates
that are always under 5m away from the true source position,
except for a corner case at the third time instant where our
estimate is off by 15m.
D. Three-Dimensional Simulation
Lastly, we performed a three-dimensional trajectory simula-
tion where sensor S1 is attacked by 30µs as before. We added
altitude coordinates 600m, 1250m, 900m and 700m to S1, S2,
S3 and S4, respectively. In order to achieve the same level of
redundancy as before, we placed a fifth sensor on the grid at
an altitude of 400 meters. From each TDOA, we computed
the corresponding hyperboloids and used the coordinate-wise
weighted median of intersection points as initial solution
(xg, yg, zg) to the WLS estimator. The results are illustrated in
Figure 8. We observe in Figure 8 that the altitude of the naive
estimates fluctuates far from the true altitude of the source.
Whereas, our robust solution provides accurate estimates in-
distinguishable from the source. Similarly, Figure 8 shows that
the 2D trajectory obtained with our solution on the xy-plane,
matches with the trajectory of the source, whereas the naively
estimated trajectory is always more than 2km wrong. Finally,
a close-up look in 2D at time instant number 4 shows that our
estimate is less than 2m away from the source. However, not
shown on the figures, at time instant number 4, our estimate’s
altitude is off by approximately nine meters, whereas the naive
estimate’s altitude is off by more than a kilometer. Note that for
this simulation, with weight function exponent v = 15.0776,
we obtain a high confidence metric equal to 0.94. In this
simulation, the true source is at a constant altitude of 350m,
which is below the height of approximately the twenty highest
towers on Earth. The minimal altitude found with the naive
estimates is at 752m, which is above all towers in the region
of interest. A naive estimator would fail to detect a potential
collision danger in this case. In contrast, the altitude of our
robust estimates is always between 339m and 377m, which
allows us to detect a dangerous flight behaviour.
VIII. CONCLUSION
To conclude, in this paper, we have shown that timing
attacks on the time reference of the sensors of the network
are a threat to TDOA localization. By injecting a few micro-
seconds into the clock of a sensor, the network estimates
the source to be located kilometers away from the true
source position. We have also shown that a strong attacker
with knowledge of the sensor coordinates and of the source
coordinates, is able to choose the delays to inject such that the
resulting misestimation results in a specific targeted location.
To counter such timing attacks, we have proposed a robust
technique that, to attribute weights to all sensor pairs, relies on
signals from a known calibration source of a known position.
These weights are computed to reflect the confidence we have
in the time synchronization of the corresponding sensor pair.
Subsequently, our localization technique uses these weights
either to identify the network as too corrupt to localize, or to
give an accurate estimate of the unknown source location. Our
technique also provides a confidence metric that gives insight
on the accuracy of the estimate. The calibration phase of our
proposed solution is, however, vulnerable to replay attacks. In
such attacks, the calibration signal is replayed at times and
locations of the attacker’s choice, thus possibly affecting the
attributed weights. In order to counter these replay attacks, we
have provided an encrypted authenticated challenge-response
scheme that ensures that the measurements used for calibration
are trustworthy. Numerical evidence in 2D and 3D show that
our technique is efficient and that the confidence metric is
trustworthy although it might lead to false negatives.
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Fig. 8: Estimation results in 3D at eleven different time instants
when S1 is attacked by 3e − 5s; the confidence metric is high
at 0.94: (a) The altitude of the naive estimates is very inaccurate
at all time instants, our robust solution is indistinguishable from
the source. (b) in the xy-plane, the naive estimates are more than
2km wrong and our robust estimates are accurate. Zoom-in at time
instant 4: our robust estimate is less than 2m away from the source
on the xy-plane.
APPENDIX
According to Theorem 1, if the attacker is unable to jam signals,
our encrypted authenticated challenge-response scheme is secure
against a replay attack and the resulting n measurements can then be
given as input to Algorithm 1. Now, in order to show that Claim 1
is correct, we show that when an attacker is able to jam signals,
successfully affecting qm measurements, our strategy to select n
measurements is efficient, as long as q ≤ 0.45. Specifically, we give
numerical evidence that the weights that Algorithm 1 outputs from
the n selected measurements with and without a calibration attack
are similar. We analyze results in two scenarios.
In the first, the measured TDOA value comes from a per-
fectly synchronized sensor pair. Hence, we require that Algo-
rithm 1 on the n selected measurements, outputs a weight close
to 1. In this case, the goal of the attacker is to jam signals
in order to replay them with introduced delays such that Algo-
rithm 1 outputs a weight close to 0, thus making us discard
trustworthy measurements. For every combination of calibration-
attack size a ∈ {3, 6, 15000} and calibration-attack proportion
q ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.45, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1}, we per-
formed the following procedure ten thousand times:
• we create a data set DS160 of m = 160 i.i.d samples where a
proportion q of the m samples are drawn from N (µ + aσ, σ)
and the remaining are drawn from N (µ, σ), with µ = 7e − 7
and σ = 2.192e− 9,
• we use our selection technique with b = 12 bins, to extract the
center of the highest Gaussian distribution and keep only the
n = 30 nearest samples, resulting in DS30,
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Fig. 9: Weight for an ideally synchronized sensor pair for different
calibration-attack size and attack proportion from all 160 and the
selected 30 measurements: when q ≤ 0.45 the weight from the 30
selected measurements is always high as in the no-attack scenario;
the weight from all measurements decreases drastically as the size of
the calibration attack increases.
• for both DS160 and DS30, we compute the p-value resulting
from the z-test with µ = 7e− 7 and σ = 2.192e− 9,
• we apply the weight function of Algorithm 1 to the two p-
values: we exponentiate them to the power 1/v with v =
15.0776.
At the end of the procedure, for every combination of a and q, we
obtain two data sets of ten thousand exponentiated p-values. Figure 9
shows the sample mean of the resulting weights with a confidence
interval for every (a, q) pair, when using the entire m = 160
measurements and when using the selected n = 30 measurements.
We observe that for a choice of q ≤ 0.45, the weight obtained using
the 30 selected measurements is always high as in the no-attack
scenario, in other words, as when q = 0. Note that for a = 3 and
q = 0.45, the weight is sometimes low although it is always large
enough to ensure that the corresponding measurements are never
incorrectly discarded. Such low weight values are due to the fact
that the attack is small, comparable to large noise. Therefore the
Gaussian distribution of the attacked measurements is merged with
the Gaussian distribution of the unattacked measurements and the
highest density peak is slightly shifted by the attack. When the attack
is large enough for the intersection of the two Gaussian distributions
to be empty, the attacked measurements are less likely to be mistaken
for unattacked ones. Figure 9 also shows that the weight obtained with
all measurements without any particular strategy, decreases drastically
as the size of the calibration attack increases. From this analysis, we
observe that our strategy is very efficient in protecting our trust in
synchronized sensor pairs.
In the second scenario, the measured TDOA value comes from a
sensor pair suffering from a timing attack. Hence, we require that
Algorithm 1 outputs a weight close to 0. In this case, the aim of the
attacker is to attack calibration signals in order to compensate the
synchronization delay between the attacked sensors. His goal is for
Algorithm 1 to output a weight much higher than 0, thus making us
trust attacked measurements. For every combination of timing-attack
size a ∈ {3, 6, 15000} on the sensor pair, and calibration-attack
proportion q ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.45, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1},
we performed the following procedure ten thousand times:
• we create a data set DS160 of m = 160 i.i.d samples where
a proportion q of the m samples are drawn from N (µ, σ) and
the remaining are drawn from N (µ+ aσ, σ), with µ = 7e− 7
and σ = 2.192e− 9,
• we use our selection technique with b = 12 bins, to extract the
center of the highest Gaussian distribution and keep only the
n = 30 nearest samples, resulting in DS30,
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Fig. 10: Weight for a non-synchronized sensor pair for different
timing-attack sizes and calibration-attack proportion from all 160 and
from the selected 30 measurements: when q ≤ 0.45, both the weights
obtained using the 30 and 160 measurements are always low.
• for both DS160 and DS30, we compute the p-value resulting
from the z-test with µ = 7e− 7 and σ = 2.192e− 9,
• we apply the weight function of Algorithm 1 to the two p-
values: we exponentiate them to the power 1/v with v =
15.0776.
Figure 10 shows the sample mean of the resulting weights with
a confidence interval for every (a, q) pair, when using the entire
m = 160 measurements and when using the selected n = 30
measurements. We observe that for a choice of q ≤ 0.45, both the
weights obtained using the 30 and the 160 measurements are low.
From this analysis, we observe that when q ≤ 0.45, our strategy
is still very efficient in protecting our distrust in non-synchronized
sensor pairs.
In summary, the numerical evidence shows that as long as q ≤
0.45, our technique to select n out of the m received measurements
is efficient and enables Algorithm 1 to define proper weights. We
further recall that if q is selected too large, the attacker would be
detected by other techniques such as SNR analysis.
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